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From the beginning of Christian theology, theologians have struggled with the question of 
how suffering in the world is related to God’s providence. A classic response to this question 
is that, ultimately, God’s governance is beyond human understanding. More recently an 
eschatological solution has been preferred: God is involved in a historical process and he will 
finally overcome evil. This article argued that both responses have their own problems. In 
the first God is a hidden mystery, and in the latter either the outcome of history is uncertain 
or God is waiting unnecessarily long. On the other hand, both provide consolation to human 
beings in times of suffering. Which one of the two answers is more helpful, depends on culture 
and context. Therefore, they are both acceptable responses to the question. At a deeper level, 
one can argue that both refer to eternity − one in a spatial model (above) and the other in a 
temporal model (hereafter). Both space and time are metaphors in this context. That is also 
the case when we speak of ‘before’ with regard to God’s eternal council. Ultimately, from a 
perspective of eternity, God’s council, God’s governance and God’s final judgment coincide. In 
Christian theology these concepts can only be understood in the paradigm of God’s revelation 
in Christ, who is the expression of the mystery of creation − as is especially indicated in the 
letters to the Ephesians and Colossians.
God’s governance
God’s governance is an important topic in classic reformed theology. As regards reformed spirituality, 
it is not overstated to even claim that it is a core issue. We trust in God. We believe that we are safe 
in his guidance of our lives. In the ambiguities of life and world history, we know that God is in 
control (for classic references, see Heppe 1958:201–204, 213–223). Nothing can happen against his 
will, by which he cares for us as a loving Father. Generations of reformed Christians grew up 
with the answer of the Heidelberg Catechism (Creeds of Christendom 1563) which providence is:
[…] the almighty and everywhere present power of God, whereby, as it were by his hand, he upholds and 
governs heaven, earth, and all creatures; so that […] all things come, not by chance, but by his fatherly 
hand. (Answer 27)1 
Those who delved deeper into the basics of reformed theology, found their belief in God’s 
omnipotent governance confirmed in the strong chapters on this issue in Calvin’s Institutes (I.16f.). 
1.See also Belgic Confession, Article 13 (Creeds of Christendom 1561).
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Het lijden bezien vanuit Gods bestuur, eschatologie en Gods raad. Vanaf het begin van 
het Christendom hebben theologen geworsteld met de vraag hoe het lijden in de wereld zich 
verhoudt tot Gods voorzienigheid. Een klassiek antwoord daarop is dat ten laatste Gods 
bestuur het menselijk begrip te boven gaat. Tegenwoordig wordt eerder de voorkeur gegeven 
aan een eschatologische oplossing: God is betrokken in een proces door de geschiedenis 
waarin Hij uiteindelijk het kwaad zal overwinnen. De auteur betoogt dat beide benaderingen 
hun eigen problemen hebben. In het eerste geval is God een onkenbaar mysterie en in het 
tweede geval is de afloop onzeker of wacht God onnodig lang met zijn overwinning. Aan de 
andere kant bieden beide antwoorden mensen troost in lijdenssituaties. Welke van de twee 
antwoorden het beste is, hangt af van cultuur en context. Daarom zijn beide aanvaardbaar als 
antwoord op het probleem van Gods voorzienigheid. Op een dieper niveau kan men betogen 
dat beide verwijzen naar de eeuwigheid, het eerste antwoord in een ruimtelijk model (‘te 
boven’) en het tweede in een tijdsmodel (‘hierna’). Zowel ruimte als tijd zijn hier metaforisch 
gebruikt. Dat is ook het geval als we spreken over ‘vóór’ met betrekking tot Gods eeuwige 
raad. Uiteindelijk zijn, vanuit het perspectief van de eeuwigheid, Gods raad, Gods beleid 
en Gods laatste oordeel identiek. In de christelijke theologie kunnen deze concepten alleen 
worden verstaan in het paradigma van Gods openbaring in Christus, die de expressie van 
het geheimenis van de schepping is, zoals met name de brieven aan de Efeziërs en aan de 
Kolossenzen aangeven.
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Both Calvin and his later followers could easily refer to evidence 
for their theology of God’s governance in the Scriptures (cf. 
Institutes I.16.5–7; Van Genderen & Velema 1992:289). 
Providence gives basic trust to human lives and a deep 
relation to God, the Father in heaven. This does not mean, 
however, that this trust is uncontested. The confession 
of God’s providence claims that not only pleasant things 
come from God, but that shocking experiences also occur 
according to his will. The Heidelberg Catechism says that 
‘rain and drought, fruitful and barren years, meat and 
drink, health and sickness, riches and poverty […] come 
[…] by his fatherly hand’ (Answer 27). It is easy to believe 
that happy days are a gift of a caring, divine Father, but 
believing that severe illness is also given by him, is far more 
difficult. Nevertheless, it is precisely hardship that gives the 
confession of divine providence its power: when life runs 
out of our hands, we can trust that it does not run out of 
God’s hand (cf. Institutes I.17.8–11).
Christians believe that God is in control and they believe in 
his benevolence. However, they also try to understand why 
things happen (Institutes I.16.9; I.18.1 & 3). If God is a caring 
Father, we hope for insight in the way he leads us, because 
understanding helps us to continue along the way to which 
he calls us. Understanding is difficult in times of hardship. 
Consequently, a vast accumulation of literature on God’s 
guidance amidst confounding experiences has emerged, 
usually of a theodicean character. We try to understand 
why God, though being a benevolent Father, gives painful 
experiences. Many answers are given, and often these 
provide consolation for people in affliction. However, there 
are situations where answers fall short. In Adrio König’s 
book titled God, waarom lyk die wêreld so? (2002:32–46), he tells 
stories so shocking that we cannot believe that what happened 
to these people is willed by a benevolent God. Anybody 
who is alert to events in the world can add his or her own 
stories. What human beings suffer is above understanding; 
most of all above understanding God’s loving care for his 
creation. Even nature, as God’s creation, is beyond human 
understanding and human control (Singghi 2012:695).
The classic reaction to this enigma is that our understanding 
falls short, but not God’s providence (Institutes I.17.2). 
Human understanding is too limited to fathom the depth 
of God’s will. So, though we do not understand, we must 
trust. God knows better than we do. Nobody on earth will 
understand why a little child was tortured and killed, but in 
heaven they know. There is a transcendent solution for present 
immanent unsolvable problems (Institutes I.17.1).
Demanding too much
According to Calvin (and the Heidelberg Catechism), not 
only good, but also bad things are ordained by God. The idea 
that an omnipotent God rules a world in which children are 
horribly killed, is absolutely unacceptable to many people. If 
God is in control of such a world, they reject this God. König 
(2002) cannot cope with Calvin’s God: 
Óók die kwaad en alle sonde en lyding word deur God beveel as Hy 
dit so wil. Kom ons konkretiseer dit vir ons tyd. Die moordenaars 
wat op 11 September 2001 daardie passasiersvliegtuie in Amerika 
geskaak en daarmee in die Wêreldhandelsentrum in New York 
en die Pentagon in Washington vasgevlieg het, was volkome 
onder die beheer van God. As ’n mens Calvyn se siening van God 
se voorsienigheid konsekwent deurvoer, beteken dit dat God 
daardie duiwelse gedagte in die terroriste se koppe gesit het. 
[…] God het ook beskik dat presies die ‘regte’ mense in die 
vliegtuie was, en ook die ‘regte’ mense in die geboue. Klink dit 
verskriklik? Maar as God alle dinge wat gebeur, voorbeskik, 
geld dit tog ook alle kwaad en spesifiek alle sonde. [Also the evil 
and all sin and suffering are commanded by God, if he so wishes. Let 
us concretise this for our time. The killers that hijacked the passenger 
planes in America on 11 September 2001 and flew it into the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, was 
completely under the control of God. If one consistently carries through 
Calvin’s view of God’s providence, it means that God put those devilish 
thoughts in the terrorists’ minds. […] God also ordained that exactly 
the ‘right’ people were in the aircraft, and the ‘right’ people were in the 
buildings. Does that sound awful? But if God foreordains all things 
that happen, it is also counts for all evil and specifically all sin.] (bl. 65, 
[author’s own translation])
If God has his own hidden aims with anything that happens, 
‘watter oordeel sou Hy wou voltrek […] oor die nege maande 
oue kind wat in Oktober 2001 in die dorpie Louisvale hier in ons 
land verkrag en gesodomiseer is?’ [‘what was his aim […] with 
the nine-month-old child who was raped and sodomised 
in October 2001 in the town Louisvale here in our own 
country?’] (König 2002:68). 
König cannot believe in this God − and most people concur 
with his opinion. Like many others, he rejects ‘the God of 
Calvin’ (Hesselink 1997:111).
The conclusions that people draw from their rejection of 
God’s absolute control over human life and world history 
are diverse. Some keep to the classic definition of God as 
controlling power, but because they reject such a God, most 
of these draw the conclusion that such a God does not exist: 
‘“Het enige excuus voor God is dat Hij niet bestaat”, menen velen’ 
[‘Many people are of the opinion that the only apology for 
God is that he does not exist’] (Van den Brink & Van der 
Kooi 2012:301). The classic model of God’s omnipotence 
can go so far that even the criminal act is provided by God. 
Only its evil character is excluded from it (Leydecker 1700:II.
VI.xxv; cf. Hoek 2013:193). However, how can God provide 
the act of raping a young girl and slitting her throat without 
being involved in the evil of such a deed? If there were such 
an omnipotent God who created this world, it should be 
impossible for him to deal with his own creation in such a 
manner, unless he is an ultimately perverse Being. Speaking 
about God as the almighty Creator is thus impossible for many 
people, and due to this aporia they have lost their faith. 
Others cannot rid themselves of this image of God and keep 
on fighting against him. Their whole life is just one cry: 
‘Why?’ Why did God act in such a way as they experienced 
− in the loss of a child, a partner, in the terrible sufferings of 
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refugees, war children, raped women and murdered girls? 
Theology cannot sidestep this problem easily. Is it really 
possible to believe in an omnipotent God when we see what 
happens in the world? (cf. Blom 2009).
Redefining God’s identity
Consequently many theologians do not reject God as a caring 
Father, but they opt for a different definition of God. They 
reject the idea of God as a controlling power. John Cobb 
makes this the first rule of his theological system: ‘God is 
not controlling power’ (Cobb & Griffin 1977:9). He is a God 
who lovingly lures human beings and all existing things to 
new opportunities. That is the way his governance functions: 
providing chances and enabling human beings to find their 
way to the future. This may be a way of trial and error, but 
it is not God who initiates the failures of our ideals. On the 
contrary, he provides us continuously with new possibilities 
so that we never have to despair (Cobb & Griffin ibid; 
Cobb 1965).
Other theologians rather focus on God’s caring love in 
hardship. It is not God who brings us in these circumstances. 
Evil powers try to obstruct God’s good and peaceful creation. 
Still others claim that what happens is just by accident 
(Kushner 1981). Whatever the cause of our troubles may be, 
we find God fighting at our side. 
Both reactions, being in conflict with a belief in an almighty 
God whilst keeping the classic definition as well as redefining 
the concept of God, occur especially in modernity since 
human beings no longer accept controlling power. Human 
maturity requires at least a reasonable explanation for 
the exercise of power. If this cannot be provided, people 
will revolt against this power. Theologians in this era are 
challenged to develop theological designs that respond 
to this human maturity and thus they cannot keep to the 
classic submission to an incomprehensible Supreme Being. 
It is precisely this challenge that König (2002) expresses. 
Theologians must find other ways. Because it is difficult to 
be both a theologian and an atheist, or to live continuously 
in conflict with the God whom you confess, they opt for the 
other track: redefining God’s identity.
It conforms to modern thought to develop theological 
designs from the perspective of history, and thus of time 
(Van de Beek 1989): 
A chronological relationship is the way we order events which 
are not logically or dialectically connected. A chronological 
ordering […] is the only way in which a theology which bases 
itself on the deeds of God as criterion for its assertions can 
achieve results. (p. 261) 
In Cobb’s panentheistic model (Cobb & Griffin 1977; Cobb 
1965), this recourse to a paradigm, that is framed by time, is 
very clear: God is luring us to the future for new realisations 
of being which is also the fulfilment of God’s own dynamic 
Being. Those who focus more on counter powers that 
threaten humanity, see God’s presence from the perspective 
of his combat with evil and the liberation of humankind. 
God sides with us in our struggle for a new world and when 
we despair, he initiates new courage. God is not controlling 
power, but empowerment for a better future. God is a ‘God 
of progress, of possibility and of hope’ (Gilkey 1976:300–318).
God and history
If we view God’s involvement with the world from the 
perspective of history, the question arises whether he will 
finally overcome evil. ‘Process theology’, as developed by 
Whitehead and Cobb, is a consciously open system without an 
eschatological finalisation. Yet, due to its optimistic portrayal 
of progress by the accumulation of attained results, it is 
nevertheless a model of hope. One must wonder, however, 
how people who have lost the only one they loved, can be 
consoled by a universal perspective of a better world.
Therefore, most theologians opt for an eschatological fulfilment. 
They view history from the perspective of Revelation 21:4 
(NIV): ‘He will wipe every tear from their eyes.’ We have 
to consider that this is not a mere epistemological revelation 
of the meaning of history. It could also fit into a doctrine of 
God as controlling power: finally we will understand what is 
now still hidden from us. It is much more an eschatological 
consummation of history when Christ will overcome all 
powers. Just like humanity, God is involved in a struggle 
that will only end in the eschatological event of God’s 
final victory. For those who do not share the optimism of 
process theology and consider God’s combat with evil as a 
real struggle, waiting for the eschatological victory can be a 
real tribulation. Though we can trust God’s good intentions 
and are not hindered by the fear of a mysterium tremendum 
[overwhelming mystery] of controlling power, we are not 
sure about his power, for the future is principally open 
(Van de Beek 1986:121). Consequently, this model seems to 
make people uncertain, precisely in a context in which they 
search for consolation when attacked by bitter experiences. 
The benefit of this model over against a theology of God as 
controlling power and unfathomable fate might so be lost. 
Therefore, most theologians who deal with God’s intervention 
in history claim that he will indeed finally overcome. We 
can trust his victory. We can even trust God’s power. This, 
however, is not controlling power, but eschatological power 
as Van Gennep states: ‘God’s omnipotence is an eschatological 
concept’ (Van de Beek 2008:48; cf. Van Gennep 1989a:22; 
1989b:425–427). Along these lines, König too develops his 
theology which he presents explicitly with a view to provide 
consolation. Jürgen Moltmann has elaborated this model 
extensively. Indeed, his whole oeuvre, beginning with 
Theologie der Hoffnung (Moltmann 1964), can be considered 
an elaboration of this theology of hope. In the power of the 
Spirit (Moltmann 1975), the triune God (Moltmann 1980) 
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The future
However, the question arises: how can we be certain that 
God will eventually overcome evil? In the model of the 
transcendent knowledge of God, this certainty is implied in 
the very definition of God: though we do not understand, 
he holds everything in his hand. In the eschatological model, 
however, God is involved in a struggle until the end of the 
world. Thus, what is gained in understanding, results in a 
loss of certainty. It is only in hope that we are saved. 
Christian theologians will respond to this question by 
referring to the resurrection of Christ. Our hope is not 
unfounded. It is based on Christ’s victory over death. In his 
resurrection as the crucified one, he not only overcame death, 
but all powers of evil and injustice. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg has elaborated the relation of the 
resurrection of Christ and the final consummation of the world 
extensively. The resurrection is the prolepsis of the eschaton 
(Pannenberg 1991:393, 482; Pannenberg 1993:569–594; cf. 
Mostert 2002:112–116). In the resurrection of Christ, God 
showed that he is stronger than the powers of evil. Although 
they have ravaged history until now, we know that God is 
able to overcome them. Therefore our hope has solid ground. 
The final outcome of world history will be God’s victory that 
is proclaimed and already proleptically effected when Christ 
rose from the dead.
A new question arises now. It is the old question that Orthodox 
Church fathers put to Marcion and the Gnostics: why does 
God wait so long? (Irenaeus IV.6.2; cf. Meijering 2001:95–97; 
2008:30). The question to Marcion was about God’s coming 
in Christ. If God is ultimate love by his coming in Christ, 
why did he come so late, leaving the world through all 
those preceding times in the hand of a perverse demiurge? 
The question to Pannenberg is: If God really possesses the 
power to overcome evil, why does he wait so long? Why 
does the consummation come so late? This question was 
already urgent at the end of the 1st century (2 Pt 3:9) and 
thus it should be much more urgent in the beginning of the 
21st century. 
Peter responds to this question by referring to God’s patience. 
He gives people time to come to repentance (2 Pt 3:9). After 
2000 years of church history, this answer has been rendered 
mute. Many people do not want to come to repentance, and 
due to the corrosion of history, the message of the church 
itself has lost its power and the fresh enthusiasm of its 
beginnings. If the Christianity of Paul and Peter could not 
convert the majority of people of their time, how will 21st 
century Christianity succeed? 
Nevertheless, theologians hold on to the idea of time as an 
answer to the problem of evil. Oscar Cullmann used the 
metaphor of D-day and V-day (Cullmann 1946:72f.; cf. Beker 
1980:177). On D-day the decisive battle was won. It would 
be only a matter of time until the final victory, V-day, over 
the Nazis would come. On Easter morning the decisive 
intervention of God has come. Now it is only a matter of time 
until the whole creation will be liberated. 
This metaphor helps to understand why God’s work 
takes time. However, it also displays the weakness of the 
eschatological model. If God is really able to overcome the 
powers, why does he need more than 2000 years? These 
are not neutral years, but a time of blood, sweat and tears, 
just like the time between D-day and V-day. It is a time in 
which the things König writes about happen, a time in which 
millions of people are killed and billions of people weep. If 
God is not able to intervene more effectively, does he then 
really posses the power? Was V-day absolutely certain after 
D-day? Could the Battle of the Bulge not have changed the 
whole outcome of World War II? Until the final victory, 
you never know. 
Some theologians explicitly take the suffering of human 
history into account in connection with the final victory. It is 
the way God works: the way to glory is a way of suffering (Hall 
1986; Moltmann 1972). They can build on strong scriptural 
evidence, for this is precisely the way of Christ. He rose from 
the dead after sufferings, injustice and death. Whosoever 
belongs to him will follow him on this path: ‘In the world you 
will have trouble. But take heart! I have overcome the world’ 
(Jn 16:33 NIV). However, as a theological model it evokes 
new questions. What kind of God is he who leads his people 
to glory through pain − not the chosen pain of a sportsperson 
in training, but the unchosen pain of wounded children 
in war? Is this God not a perverse God, like the god of the 
Gnostics, whom Irenaeus blamed that he gives humans pain 
in order to be honoured as Saviour? (Meijering 2001:95ff.). 
However, Irenaeus too, like all salvation-history theologians, 
fails to answer the question of why God brings people to the 
fulfilment through suffering (Meijering ibid:146–148). Does 
this God differ from the despised ‘God of Calvin’? 
The eschatological model and the 
transcendence model
The problems in the eschatological model are not fewer 
than those in the transcendence model. The questions about 
the benevolent will of God and about his power remain 
unanswered. These questions are not theoretical problems. 
They are the enigmas of life for human beings who suffer 
and weep. In both models they beg for God’s intervention 
− not in the future and not by giving an indication why 
this suffering was necessary, but for the intervention of his 
liberating power here and now.
Both models leave us with similar questions that cut equally 
deep into the hearts of vulnerable human beings. Both try to 
provide comfort for these hearts. We can make a caricature 
of Calvin’s God as an unfathomable mystery − a brute 
tyrant who acts arbitrarily. We can also make a caricature of 
Moltmann’s hope when facing real world history. However, 
Calvin and his followers try to give rest to embattled souls 
(Hesselink 1997:111–117; Van den Belt 2008:107–109): they 
may know that their broken lives are in God’s hand. This is 
not the hand of a tyrant, but of the Father of Jesus Christ, who 
gave his life on your behalf and shared your sufferings. The 
aim of Moltmann, Pannenberg, König and other adherents of 
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the eschatological model is not different: in the ambiguities 
and even atrocities of history you may know that God’s 
decisive battle against evil is over. Christ has overcome the 
evil powers that broke your lives and we can be sure of the 
consummation of this victory. Both answers try to strengthen 
Christians to persevere in faith. 
Today the eschatological model is more acceptable than 
the transcendence model which was dominant during many 
preceding centuries. This is in accordance with the cultural 
shift that occurred with the rise of modernity. Before 
modernity, people could accept God’s governance without 
understanding and co-responsibility. This is unacceptable 
in modernity. Human beings want to understand and they 
want to be involved. Human involvement implies time, and 
thus historical development. The eschatological model offers 
this required perspective. We turn our faces from heaven to 
the future. We can understand that history takes time and we 
can hope that one day everything will change for the better. 
Even more important is the idea that human beings can be 
involved in this change. We are involved in the coming of 
God’s kingdom, whilst in the transcendence model we are 
ultimately dependent.
Human involvement as a decisive factor in God’s final 
victory is, however, not a prerogative of modern theology. 
Origenes already says that a victory of God, which consists 
of mere physical repression, is not a true victory. God’s final 
victory implies that he wins the hearts of his creatures and 
that they fully co-operate in his glory; they will no longer be 
enemies (Origenes Princ. I.6.1; III.6.5v). On the other hand, 
absolute dependence is a gift at the very moment that human 
beings are not able to act or to understand anymore. When 
the darkness of pain and suffering is too strong, we may 
know that God is stronger and that even this situation has 
not run out of his hand − though we do not understand it. 
Both models have biblical roots. So there should be no 
reason to put them in opposition or even in conflict with 
each other. It is better either to conclude that theologians 
can develop different models for expressing God’s relation 
to the world that is more complex than a simple model can 
express, or to develop a comprehensive model that includes 
both perspectives in a different paradigm. In the following 
sections some steps are taken to do the latter.
Time and eternity
So far we argued that references to God’s transcendence or to 
his eschatological victory as an answer to the inequity of evil 
in creation do not differ very much. In both cases we are left 
with unanswered problems and both try to comfort people 
who are lost in despair.
We can also argue on a more profound systemic level that both 
responses do not differ. The transcendence model makes 
use of a spatial metaphor. The fact that God’s government 
of our life is beyond our understanding, is interpreted from 
the idea that heaven is above the earth. Human beings live on 
earth and God is in heaven. ‘As the heavens are higher than 
the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my 
thoughts than your thoughts’, says the prophet Isaiah (Is 55:9 
NIV). The eschatological model applies time as a metaphor: 
in the future God will overcome evil. 
Theologians are usually very well aware that ‘above’ is 
metaphorical language. However, they often show less 
awareness that ‘time’ is also a metaphor. Eschatology is 
about the end of history and about the end of time. Anything 
beyond history is thus beyond time (Gilkey 1976:318). It 
follows therefore that we can only speak about eschatological 
time metaphorically just as we speak about heaven as 
‘above’ metaphorically. Both concepts, that is time and 
space, are beyond earthly reality. They belong to what we 
call ‘eternity’. Eternity is not endless time, but God’s reality 
which is beyond time − or if one prefers: what is ‘above’ 
time. Both metaphors deal with the same reality. The one 
does so in terms of transcendence, and the other in terms of 
time and eschatological future. However, classic orthodox 
theology teaches that in eternity there is no time or space 
in the proper sense, as we apply these concepts to our own 
world. ‘Eternity means that it has no beginning, no ending, 
and no sequence of time, that is: duration according to before 
and later, according to present, past and future’ (Turrettini 
1696 Institutio III.10.1; cf. Meijering 1991:113). 
This implies that both models actually refer to the very 
same reality − to God’s reality: one from the perspective of 
space and the other from the perspective of time. From the 
perspective of eternity they are one and the same and thus 
it does not matter which of the two we use. Calvin is not 
worse than König, and Leydecker must not be preferred to 
Moltmann. Which model we opt for fully depends on the 
effects that they have on human beings in a specific place 
and moment. Both are designed in order to give human 
beings consolation in suffering. The choice between the 
one and the other is not defined by eternity. Eternity leaves 
each approach open. Which one we apply depends fully on 
the human beings who live in space and time, in a specific 
space and at a specific time. We must carefully analyse their 
historical and cultural position in order to be able to give 
the right answer. 
We cannot generalise the answer as if, for instance in view 
of the advent of modernity – we must always use the 
eschatological model. Not all people live synchronically. In 
fact, we can apply both metaphors to the same person on the 
same day if we proclaim the comfort of the gospel correctly. 
During the funeral service, a pastor can say to a mourning 
husband and his children: ‘Mother is in heaven. We cannot 
cope with our sorrow, but God has given eternal happiness 
to her.’ Half an hour later, at the graveside, the pastor says: 
‘This grave will be opened and she will arise in glory at the 
youngest day.’ Nobody will object that the two proclamations 
are inconsistent. The intuition of faith understands that which 
troubles many theologians. The unity of eternal life is beyond 
inconsistencies and consistencies of time and space.
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God’s eternal council
Augustine (Conf. XI.13) argued that time belongs to creation. 
He does so in order to respond to the question as to what 
God did before he created the world. Because time belongs 
to creation, there is no ‘before’ to creation. The same with 
eschatology: there is no ‘after’ to history. Modern physics 
claims that time and space belong intrinsically together: both 
belong to one and the same continuum. This implies that where 
there is no time, there is also no space. There is not an ‘above’ 
the earth and the stars. There is not an ‘under’ the earth − 
there we will just see the stars of the very same universe. 
The time-space-continuum in which we live, is like an island 
in the ocean of eternity. Maybe there are other universes with 
similar characteristics or with totally different properties; 
maybe with a kind of time that is not related to space, or space 
of a kind that is not connected to time. We do not know. We 
cannot but think in the categories of time and space. We cannot 
even distinguish whether this is a property of our mind or 
of the external world also, as Immanuel Kant argued.
So far, we dealt with transcendence and with time as an 
eschatological category and concluded that they concern 
one and the same reality: eternity. Now that we introduced 
Augustine, we can push the argument further: not only 
is time, as an eschatological category, a metaphor, but the 
same applies with regard to the beginning of creation. This 
metaphor − before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:4) 
− concerns the very same reality as transcendence and the 
eschaton, namely eternity which surrounds the universe of 
time and space. God’s council before the foundation of the 
world is God’s eternal council (cf. Heppe 1958:107–109). It 
is not a matter of time − of ‘before’ in a proper sense. The 
‘before’ is just another metaphor for God’s eternity, just like 
‘above’, ‘beyond’ and ‘after’ are metaphors with regard to 
eternity in relation to the created world.
In eternity, God’s eternal council and God’s eternal judgment 
belong to one and the same reality and so, too, God’s 
governance over human life and history. This is neither a 
reality of before and later nor a reality of here and yonder. 
It is the very same reality without time and without space. 
Thus, God’s eternal council is not different from his final 
judgment and his final judgment has the very same content 
as his council. Both are the same as his governance, so that 
his guidance over world history does not lead away from his 
council. His judgment is identical with his will.
God’s benevolent will
There is a risk that people consider the eternal council as 
a deterministic fate. World history is as it should be and 
nothing in God’s eternal decisions can be changed. There is 
a risk that people consider God’s governance as a capricious 
mystery that nobody can understand and must merely 
accept. Quietism, then, will be the best attitude of life. There 
is a risk that people consider God’s final judgment as an act of 
revenge upon people who disobeyed his commandments − 
an act in which a wrathful God enjoys the pains of those who 
neglected him. World history can then become irrelevant 
and fatalistic in relation to eternity, and human beings 
seem as flies in the eyes of an omnipotent God. As a result, 
people can view themselves as flies whose capricious lives 
merely await the day that they will be crushed. Theological 
designs in modernity are usually sensitive to the aberrances 
of a theology of God’s eternal council and a theology of his 
transcendent mysterious will. They are less sensitive to the 
aberrances of the eschatological model, because it is a model 
that provides hope − and maybe because we ourselves are 
involved. Precisely this latter aspect should make us more 
critical. If we consider what human beings are capable of, 
and learn from history, we should rather consider Dante’s 
adage for hell: ‘All hope abandon ye who enter here.’ He 
who enters world history should know about blood, sweat 
and tears, and about the thorns and thistles of injustice and 
violence. Kant was right with his cynical remark to optimistic 
healers: ‘I die of mere healing’ (Kant 1798:93). History is 
much the same and improved technology will not result in 
improved morals. Those who designed the classic models of 
God’s governance and his hidden will and who reflected on 
God’s eternal council, would be just as sensitive to a modern 
theology of hope as the latter is sensitive to the idea of a 
hidden will. 
Only in the light of Christ
We cannot deal with all these models as such. We cannot even 
deal with them as different approaches for responding to one 
and the same problem, namely that we cannot understand 
how the present world can be the world of a benevolent God. 
As such, they only point to a reality beyond our history and 
understanding. As such, they are an empty claim − both 
with regard to a real reference and to their content. That 
makes them a mysterium tremendum [overwhelming mystery] 
without any appeal, but filled with fear or even abhorrence. 
Christian theology can only deal with these models if we 
learn from Scripture. In any of the models that we develop, 
we should always take into account that God is not a mere 
mystery, but that he has revealed himself in Christ. That is 
a revelation in time and space: 2000 years ago in Palestine. 
Christ is, however, the presence of the eternal God, the Name 
that is above every name (Phlp 2:9 NIV), the true God and 
eternal life (1 Jn 5:20 NIV). ‘All things were created by him 
and for him’ (Col 1:16). The Christ of history and time is 
before all things (Col 1:17). He is the hidden mystery that is 
beyond our time (Col 1:26).
If we speak about God’s eternal council, then we must take 
into account what Ephesians says: ‘He chose us in him from 
before the creation of the world’ (Eph 1:4 NIV). The church 
father Irenaeus rejects the question: ‘What did God do before 
he created the world?’ (Adv. Haer. II.28.3). Trying to answer 
this question would be a blasphemous attempt to enter God’s 
very being. Augustine answers that we cannot speak about 
‘before creation’ in the proper sense (Conf. XI.13). However, 
even if we conceive ‘before’ as ‘beyond’ − as is included 
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in both Irenaeus’ and Augustine’s answer − the question 
remains: How do we know about God’s decisions that are 
beyond the present world, but that nevertheless define how 
this world runs? Without knowing God’s transcendent will, 
we cannot understand the world in which we live. 
Before the world was founded
The letter to the Ephesians answers the question what God did 
before he created the world: ‘Before creation God chose us in 
Christ to be holy and blameless in his sight.’ The ‘before’ may 
be improper, but the letter indicates that beyond this world 
we find God’s benevolent will. The ocean that surrounds the 
universe of time and space is the ocean of God who loves the 
world. Therefore we may understand God’s hidden will in 
his governance of the world as his will that he displays in the 
crucified Christ. If we speak about transcendence and being 
hidden, then human beings may know that their lives are 
hidden in Christ with God (Col 3:3). Thus we participate in 
his glory. Christian hope is the expression of the same reality 
from the perspective of time. We ‘will appear with him in 
glory’ (Col 3:4). According to the author of the letters to the 
Ephesians and the Colossians, everything is in Christ. He is 
before the creation, he is in heaven, and he will appear. The 
ultimate meaning of humans’ lives is also in him: he chose 
them before creation, they are now hidden in him with God 
and they will appear with him in glory. He is the ultimate 
mystery of being (Col 1:26). So he is the answer to the question 
what width and length and height and depth is (Eph 3:20) − 
the fundamental philosophical categories of being.
Christ as the key to creation and history
Other authors of the New Testament express this conviction 
each in their own way. Matthew begins his gospel with 
‘The book of the genesis of Jesus Christ’ and again, after 
Jesus’ genealogy, with ‘the genesis of Jesus Christ’ (Mt 1:18), 
referring to him as the fulfilment of creation, and he ends 
with Christ who proclaims: ‘All authority in heaven and on 
earth has been given to me’ (Mt 28:18). John begins with the 
Word through whom all things were created (Jn 1:1–3). 
The Revelation of John deals explicitly with this issue. The 
book describes the disasters of world history in expressive 
pictures. World history is a chaos of powers, injustice, 
disasters and suffering in which no consistent meaning can 
be found. The book of Revelation indicates this with the 
image of a sealed book that nobody can open (Rv 5:1–3). The 
meaning of history is concealed.
In this aporia it is proclaimed that the Lion of the tribe of 
Judah is found worthy to open the book (Rv 5:5). Only Christ 
can reveal the mystery of history and give meaning to its 
senseless chaos. When he appears before the visionary, the 
apostle sees a Lamb − as if it has been slain (Rv 5:6). This 
indicates that the meaning of history is only clear in this 
perspective. The meaning of history is found in a lamb that is 
slain. This is the paradigm for understanding what is going 
on in world history, in its communities and in the lives of 
human beings.
Without Christ, not only history, but any theological design 
will end in a dark mystery for those who evaluate it critically. 
In Christ we have hope − the hope of those who are crucified 
with him and who live in the temple of God; a temple not made 
by human hands, but the temple that is the body of Christ.
This approach gives a totally different view on what happens 
in the world. König’s question ‘God, waarom lyk die wêreld 
so?’ [‘God, why does the world look like this?’], which is the 
question of almost all people who think about suffering, is 
usually put from the presupposition that the world should 
not be as it is. It should be a world without suffering. In the 
perspective of the Lamb, however, suffering belongs to the 
world’s very being. Suffering is not strange. It is normal. It is 
according to the norm of creation: the suffering Christ. In the 
introductory letters, the book Revelation expresses this with 
other words: Christ is the arche [origin, beginning, principle 
and ruler] of God’s creation, and he is this as the faithful 
martus [witness] (Rv 3:14).
Conclusion
A christological approach of questions about God’s 
governance implies that suffering should not be a problem in 
the theological discourse. This does not mean that suffering 
is no longer suffering. On the contrary, the very depth of 
suffering is revealed, because the suffering Christ, when 
dying, cries: ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken Me?’ 
(Mk 15:34). All associations related to his death on the cross 
are included in these words. Suffering is extreme and hard, 
according to Scripture. It is not strange to created reality, 
however. According to the book of Revelation, the emblem 
of creation is a mortally wounded lamb with blood flowing 
from its body. That gives a different perspective on human 
suffering. It would be a challenge for Christian theologians 
to elaborate a discourse on suffering and God’s governance 
in this paradigm. This would not be a totally new track. Early 
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